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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
Al\IERICAN EXPRESS CO.,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vsUTAH FEATHERS, a division of
MILLER SKI COMPANY, a
corpora tion,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
12,852

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an action in contract, by an International
Freight Forwarder (Respondent, American Express
Company) against a shipper (Appellant, Utah
Feathers) for freight and other charges advanced by
American Express Co., in shipping feathers for the
appellant to Europe.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court, sitting without a jury, awarded
judgment to American Express Co. for the freight
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and other charges they had incurred m the principal
sum of $4,111.56.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT
The Appellant acknowledges owing $1,534.35, but
is seeking a reversal of that part of the judgment that
exceeds $1,534.35.
STATE1\:1ENT OF FACTS
The Statement of li'acts set forth in the brief of
Appellant is correct except for the following exceptions
and clarifications:
l t is not only claimed that the American Express
Co. expended $4,111.56 on behalf of Utah I•'eathers for
ocean freight charges, inland freight charges, insurance
premiums. and documentation charges, but it is admitted by Utah Feathers that this sum was so expended.
(Transcript page 59 Jines 1-2, lines 15-20, page 24 lines
15-16, page 73 lines 7-30, page 74 lines 1-3); and in
expending this sum there is no dispute but that three
different shipments of feathers were made for Utah
Feathers. (Transcript pages 10-18 and Appellant's
brief, page 10 paragraph 2 lines 1-2)
Also, the contract for shipping in this case was between Utah Feathers and the shipping company. (Transcript page 41 lines 12-13, page 33 lines 8-12, page 34
lines 16-28, page 39 lines 26-30, page 40 lines 1-3, and
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page 41 lines 12-15) Only the contract of agency was
between Utah Feathers and the American Express Co.
The American Express Co. was not licensed to, and
made no quotation to Utah Feathers on rates. (Transcript page 25 lines 27-30, and page 26 lines 1-14.) The
American Express Co. had no tariffs on file with the
Federal .l\Iaritime Commission permitting American
Express Co. to quote charges. The American Express
Co. could only obtain the charges from the correct
source and convey them to the shipper, which it did in
this case. (Transcript page 24 lines 28-30 and page 25
lines 1-16, page 33 lines 8-30, page 34 lines 16-28, and
page 36 lines 20-23.)
The American Express Co. acted as an agent for
Utah Feathers in arranging for a shipping company to
haul the Appellant's feathers, and the sole question involved in this case is whether or not the American Express Co. is entitled to reimbursement for all of the
ocean freight charges which they advanced to the shipping company in getting the feathers to Europe, or
whether the conduct of the American Express Co. was
such as to prevent it from securing reimbursement for
all of these charges. Utah Feathers admits owing all
of the other charges and admits owing the ocean freight
charges to the extent that the rate is computed on the
weight of the cargo rather than on the volume. In other
words, Utah Feathers admit that they owe the sum of
$1, 534.35 and not the sum of $4,111.56, which AmeriExpress Co. actually paid. The difference of $2,-
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577.21 being the computation of the rate on a volume
basis rather than on a weight basis.

STATE.MENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
AW ARD .JUDGl\IENT TO THE
AGENT FOR SU1\1S BEYOND THE
AJHOU:NT AUTHORIZED BY THE
PRINCIPAL, AND THERE WAS
THEREFORE NO ERROR COlVIMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR
IN FAILING TO FIND THAT
THERE 'i\T AS AN OFFER l\IADE BY
THE AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. TO
'"rHIClI UTAH FEATHERS CONVEYED AN ANS\\TER VARYING
TERlVIS OF THAT OFFER BY
Lll\IITING THE RATES TO l\IEASURE UY WEIGHT ONLY, AND THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
FAILING TO FIND Tl-IAT THERE
WAS A COUN'TEROF:FER WHICH
SET THE LIMIT OF THE AGENT'S
AUTHOUITY.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT COl\lMI'fTED
NO ERROR IN I<,INDING THAT
UTAI-1 FEATHERS WAS CHARGEAIJLE 'VITH KNOWLEDGE THAT
THE RATES GIVEN TO UTAH
l•,EA'l'I-IERS BY THE AMERICAN
EXPRESS CO.
MADE WITHIN THE CUSTOM AND USAGE OF
THE BUSINESS.
POINT IV
THE AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. ADVANCED IN GOOD FAITH AND ON
BEilA. LF OF UT AH FEATHERS
ALL OF THE OCEAN FREIGHT
CHARGES IN ACCORDANCE WITH
BOTH THE RATE SCHEDULE FURNISHED UTAH FEATHERS AND
THE PUBLISHED TARII1'FS, AND
THEY ARE 'rHEREFORE ENTITLED TO
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL

C 0 UR T DID NOT
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A \VAR D .JUDG l\IENT TO THE
AGENT 11'0R SUl\IS BEYOND THE
AUTI-IORIZED BY THE
PRINCIPAL, AND THERE WAS
THEREFORE NO ERROR COM.MITTED BY TIIE TRIAL COURT.
The American Express Co. was an International
Freight Forwarder and as such was licensed by the
Federal :1\Iaritime Commission to handle export and import documtation. (Transcript page 24 lines 23-28)
The American Express Co. did not have any files or
tariffs on file with the Federal .1\Iaritime Commission
permitting it to quote charges. The Americn Express
Co. could only obtain the charges from the correct
source and relay them on to Utah J<'eathers. (Transcript page 2'1 lines 28-30, page 25 lines 1-16) This
is exactly what the American Express Co. did after
receiving Utah 11,eathers' letter of August 20, 1968
(Exhibit 20) inquiring as to the rates for the shipment
of feathers. The American Express Co. replied with
their letter of August 26, 1968 (Exhibit 11) stating
that there was no specific rate item for feathers quoted
in the Pacific Coast European Conference Tariff, but
that the cargo would go as cargo not otherwise specified,
and the American Express Co. set forth in this letter
the non-conferencc rate and the conference rate as they
had been given to them, together with the other charges
involved in shipping, and the American Express Co.
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set forth the advantages of signing a Conference
Agreement and securing a lower rate.
To this letter Utah Feathers responded August 30,
1968, stating that they wished to sign a Conference
Agreement, and American Express Co. then replied by
letter September 3. 1968, enclosing two copies of Shippers' Rate Agreement (Exhibit 12) from the Pacific
Coast European Conference. The Conference Agreement was never signed by Utah Feathers although they
maintained they had done so right up to the very end of
the trial, and at which time they finally admitted they
had not signed it. (Transcript page 84 lines 11-20, Exhibit 12, page 9 Appellant's brief)
The foregoing admittedly constitute all of the evidence. relative to the principal and agency relationship
of Utah Feathers and American Express Co., except
for Exhibit 21, which is a letter which Utah Feathers
claims to have mailed to the American Express Co.
September 4, 1968, but which letter the trial court correctly ruled was never delivered to nor received by the
American Express Co. All of the evidence with regards
to that letter is contained in the following pages of the
transscript. (Transcript page 77 lines 29-30, page 78
lines 1-13, page 67 lines 7-30, page 68 lines 1-28, and
page 37 lines 19-25)
It is hard to understand with any stretch of the
imagination how Utah Feathers can say that the American Express Co., in this case, exceeded their authority
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m arrangmg for the shipment of feathers under the
rate schedule that had been relayed to Utah Feathers,
and which schedule had been set up by the Pacific Coast
European Conference and approved by the Federal
l\ raritime Commission. The American Express Co. arranged for the feather shipments on the only rate that
was available, paid the shipping company the freight
charges, and then looked to Utah Feathers for reimbursement.
Contrary to the Appellant's contention, there can
he no question as to the loyalty and good faith of the
American Express Co. throughout the entire transaction. For their nominal fee of $25 they endeavored
to get Utah Feathers together with an Ocean Freight
line on the shipment of their feathers. The American
Express Co. set no rates, neither did they have any
power or voice in determining whether the rate would
be charged by weight or by volume. They simply passed
on to Utah Feathers the rates quoted to them by the
Pacific Coast European Conference, and which Conference represents all conference vessels to Europe.
It is no fault of American Express Co. if Utah
Feathers placed an erroneous interpretation upon this
rate schedule and tried to obtain a shipment of their

feathers at such a ridiculously low figure. As the record
in this case clearly shows, the rates were set by the shippiug companies, who, before they can actually charge
the rate, must obtain the approval of the Federal .Mari-

time Commission, and there is therefore an assurance
of fairness in these rates to both carrier and shipper.
This is certainly not a case where the agent has a
duty to shop around in the interest of his principal to
find the very lowest rate, because the rates in this case
are fixed, and are uniform, and no carrier is permitted
to charge either a lower or a higher rate than the published tariff. The American Express Co. merely acted
as an intermediary in relaying to Utah Feathers the
information they had received relative to rates and available ships.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR
IN FAILING TO FIND THAT
THERE 'iV AS AN OFFER MADE BY
THE AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. TO
WHICII UTAH FEATHERS CONVEYED AN ANS,iVER VAR.YING
THE TERL\IS OF THAT OFFER BY
Lil\IITING THE RATES TO :MEASURE BY WEIGHT ONLY, AND THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
!•'AILING TO FIND THAT THERE
'VAS A COUNTEHOFFER WHICH
SET THE LIMIT O:F' THE AGENT'S
AUTHORITY.
There is no question but that the agency relationship between the American Express Co. and Utah
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Feathers was created by correspondence and by the acts
of the parties, and that the terms of that agency were
determined by the trial court from the correspomlence
heretofore referred to and by the act of Utah Feathers
m delivering their feathers to the carrier.
There is no doubt hut that Utah Feathers inquired
of the American Express Co. as to what rates and what
vessels were available for shipment of feathers, and
that American Express Co. replied giving them the
rate schedule supplied by the Pacific Coast European
Conference, and that following that Utah Feathers had
the American Express Co. arrange for shipment of
their feathers and that the feathers were shipped and
that American Express Co. then billed Utah Feathers
for the money they had advanced in getting the feathers
to Europe. The American Express Co. made an offer
to assist Utah Feathers with their feather shipments by
providing them with the rate schedule for the Ocean
Freight, insurance and documentary charges. This offer
was accepted by the delivery by Utah F'eathers of their
cargoes to the carrier for shipment.
'Ve submit, in spite of the Appellant's contention
to the contrary, that the American Express Co. used
all the care, skill and diligence required of them in carrying out their duties in this matter. In 3 Am. Jur. 2nd,
Agency, Section 202, page 584, we find the law clearly
stated:
"Only a reasonable degree of care is required1
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and an agent is held only to the standard of
skill ordinarily possessed by persons of common capacity engaged in the same occupation
or business. Nor can an agent be held liable to
the principal because he failed to procure for
him something to which the latter is not entitled; actionable negligence on the part of an
agent can be predicated only upon the invasion
or loss of some legal right of the principal."
Utah 11,eathers, under the published tariffs, was
not entitled to any lower rate than they received for
the shipment of their feathers, and under no pretext
can they be heard to complain that the agent failed to
procure for them a lower rate to which they were not
entitled.
And in Section 204 and 205 of this same text we
find:
"An agent who contracts to perform personal
servcie does not undertake to render perfect
service, and mere error in judgment, not due to
want of care or diligence, or to fraud or unfair dealing, are not actionable." "JJut even an
agent with proported skills is not an insurer of
his work and will not be responsible for a mere
error of judgment where he exercised the due
care and appropriate skill of his profession."
(Scott et al. vs. Security Title Im. & Guarantee Co., 72 Pac. (2nd) 143, Calif.
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And in 3 C. J. S., Agency Section 156:
"Since an agent is required to exercise only
ordinary care, skill and diligence, he is not, in
the absence of an express argreement, an insurer of the success of his undertaking, and
does not guarantee the principal against incidental losses, or undertake that he will commit
no en-ors or mistakes, and so will not be liable
for losses occurring without any fault or negligence on his part. Neither is he liable if he
has acted in good faith and with due care, for
loss due to a mere mistake, including losses
arising out of mistakes in doubtful matters of
law."

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT
NO ERROR IN FINDING THAT
l TTAll I<'EATHERS 'VAS CHARGEARLE \VI'l'H KNO,VLEDGE THAT
THE RATES GIVEN TO UTAII
FEATI-IERS BY THE Al\IERICAN
EXPRESS CO. WERE :MADE WITHIN THE CUSTOM: AND USAGE OF
THE BUSINESS.
It is undisputed that by custom and usage at the
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San Francisco Port, from which port these feathers
were shipped, that the carrier has the option whether to
charge the rate by weight or by volume. (Transcript
page 26 lines 15-22, page 43 lines 19-30, and page 44
lines 1-21) Any other custom or usage would soon
bankrupt an Ocean Carrier if they were compelled to
haul such cargo as feathers on any other rate charge
than by volume.
Earl l\Iiller claims in one breath to be a
in oceanic shipping and to be relying heavily upon the
superior knowledge and experience of American Express Co., and in the next breath he testifies that he
has been shipping feathers to Europe for the past 20
years, (Transcript page 52 line 30, and page 53 lines
1-2) and that he has been engaged in international trade
in 42 countries, (Transcript page 76 line 30 and page
77 lines 1-8) and yet Utah Feathers would have us believe from their brief (Page 28) that Earl ::Miller is a
man of only ordinary experience in this field and that
"Ordinary experience would not have told him (Mr.
l\Iiller) that l\fr. Ewing's quote of rates would allow
the carrier the option of how to charge the rate." (Appellant's brief page 28 paragraph 4)
l\Ir. l\Iiller testified that all of his previous 20
years of experience in oceanic shipping had be e n
through the New York port and that there, by custom
and usage, it was shipper's choice. (Transcript page 52
line 30 and page 53 line 102) (\Ve submit that it was
certainly gross negligence, even recklessness, for Mr.
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J\J iller to assume that all customs and usage would be
the same in all ports and to fail to make some investigation or inquiry as to who had the choice at San Francisco, and especially in shipping such an extraordinary
cargo as feathers. There is no question but that Utah
Feathers were chargeable with knowledge of the usage
and custom in question in this case.
In 3 Am. J ur. 2nd, Agency, Section 72, we find:
"To effectuate an authority conferred upon an
agent, there will be implied authority to adopt
any recognized usage or mode of dealing in that
business. That is, an agent will be deemed to
have implied authority from his principal to do
business in his behalf in accordance with the
general custom, usage and procedures in that
business." (Restatement, Agency, 2nd Edition, Section 34, 76 A. L. R. 1250)
In Restatement, Agency, 2nd Edition, Section 36,
we find:
"Unless otherwise authorized, an agent is
authorized to comply with relevant usages of
business if the principal has notice that usages
of such a nature may exist. (Emphasis added)
And in 3 .Am. J ur. 2nd, Agency, Section 72:
"The fact that the principal is not aware of
the exact character of the custom or usage is
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not material if he has notice that usages of
such nature may exist." (Emphasis added)

(Jlall v.11. Paine, 224 Mass. 62, 112 N.E. 153; Rohobough
t's. United State.Y Exp. Co., 50 W.Va. 148, 40 S.E. 398;
Peterson vs. New York City, 194 N.Y. 437, 87 N.E.
772; Hilsinger vs. Trichell, 86 Ohio St. 286, 99 N.E.
305)

There is no question but that Utah Feathers knew,
not only that custom may, but that it actually did exist
in the matter of fixing the rate for oceanic shipment of'
feathers.
And in 3 C. J. S., Agency, Section 149 at page 31
we find:
"Except as limited by special instructions, the
known usages and customs of the particular
business for which an agent is engaged enter
into and form a part of his authority and duty
and he will be held liable for losses due to a
failure to act according to such usages and
if he does act
customs, and on the other
in accordance therewith he will not, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, be
liable for any loss resulting."
In Burli:e v. Bonat, 255 N. Y. 226, 174 N.E. 635,

we find:

"The determination of what is the ordinary
business procedure is commonly one of fact to
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be answered by the jury unless the course of
business is well-known as to be a subject of
judicial notice."

Utah Feathers contends that for 20 years they
had been following a custom and usage at the New York
port and although Utah Feathers knew full well that
custom and usage played an important part in arriving
at the rate to be charged for shipping feathers, they had
no reason to assume that this custom and usage would
be the same at the San J;"'rancisco port, which is situated
on the opposite end of the continent.

POINT IV
THE AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. ADVANCED IN GOOD J;'AITH AND ON
BEHALF
UT AH FEATHERS
ALL OF TIIE OCEAN J;"'REIGHT
CHARGES IN ACCORDANCE WITH
BOTH THE RATE SCHEDULE FURNISHED UTAH FEATIIERS AND
THE PUilLISHED TARIFFS, AND
THEY ARE TI-IEREFORE ENTITLED TO REil\iBURSEl\IENT.
In 3 Am. Jur. 2nd, Agency, Section 243, we find:
"As a general rule, where an agent is employed or directed by another to do an act in
his behalf, the law implies a promise of indemnity by the principal for damage resulting to
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the agent proximately from the execution of
the agency, and of reimbursement for necessary expenses advanced or incurred by the
agent in order to consummate that which he is
directed to do." Restatement, Agency, 2nd
Edition, Section 438.
And in 3 C. J. S., Agency, Section 197, Page 103
and Section 198, Page 108:
"l\Ioney advanced by the agent to others under
the terms of the Agency Agreement, if not for
illegal purposes, may be recovered from the
principal by the agent."
"An agent is not to be deprived of his right to
indemnity, however, for mere mistakes of
judgment where he has acted in good faith."
And in Restatement of Agency, 2nd Edition, Sec-

tion 439:

"Unless otherwise agreed, a principal is subject to a duty to exonerate an agent who is not
barred by the illegality of his conduct to indemnify him for:
(a) Authorized payment made by the agent
on behalf of' the principal.
(e) Payments resulting in benefit to the principal, made by the agent under such cir-
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cumstances that it would be inequitable for
indemnity not to be made."
And on page 330 of the same text:
"The authority to pay money to third persons
on account of the principal, or to incur liability in the course of the person's business, may
be created by specific directions or may be the
result of the course of business between the
principal and the agent, or of the customs of
the business in which the agent is engaged by
the principal."
And in Section 8C of this same text:
"A person who has been unjustly enriched at
the expense of another is required to make
restitution to the other."
"Similarly the duty of the principal to indemnify the agent and in other situations, the duty
of the agent to indemnity the principal, is created by the rules of restitution. In fact, a
large proportion of the rule stated in the Restatement of Restitution are applicable to
agency situations."
And in Iloggan vs. Cahoon, 26 Ut. 444, 73 Pac.
512:

"When an agent is employed or directed by his
principal to do an act and he acts within the
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scope of his authority, the law implies a promise
to reimburse for necessary expenses advanced
or incurred by the agent in order to consummate that which he is directed to do."
CONCLUSION
There is no question but that the American Express Co. was loyal aud used due care and good faith
in transmitting to Utah Feathers the rate quotations
they had received from the Pacific Coast European
Conference, and that using this rate schedule Utah
Feathers had three shipments of feathers shipped to
Europe, and for which, American Express Co. advanced in behalf of Utah Feathers1 $4,11.56 in freight
and other charges, and for which the American Express
Co. is· entitled to reimbursement.
RECPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this 14th
day of August, 1972.
DEAN E. TERRY

Attorney for Plaintiff-Reapondent
192 South 100 East
Provo, Utah 84601

